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Abstract
This paper presents a statistical analysis of the relationship between economic performance and competitiveness indicators to address 
the question of the extent to which competitiveness indicators provideuseful information when assessing economic performance. 
The analysis was performed on various examples of African economies. The possible relationships between economic performance 
and competitiveness indicators were examined by extending a basic relationship between economic performance per capita and 
investment by competitiveness indicators. The models were estimated by means of an Arellano-Bond estimator. The authors detected 
many statistically significant relationships between economic performance and competitiveness indicators in the cases of both the 
whole sample and specifically middle-income economies. However, in the case of low-income economies there are no discernible 
relationships between economic performance and the information included in the competitiveness indicators. The paper contributes 
to the analysis of the economic performance of African economies, for which the empirical evaluation of possible links between 
economic performance and competitiveness indicators is altogether missing.
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1 Introduction
The regularly published competitiveness indicators repre-
sent potentially important information which constitutes 
part of the overall set of both economic and non-economic 
information on which the economic decision-making of 
individual agents and institutions is based. The aim of this 
paper is to evaluate to what degree, if any, the published 
data on national competitiveness by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), probably the most well-known competi-
tiveness indicators, is relevant in assessing the develop-
ment of economic performance of African economies.
We choose African economies for two reasons. Firstly, 
as we show in the discussion of factors of economic growth 
below, African economies constitute a set of highly diversi-
fied countries as compared to the so-called advanced econ-
omies, the analysis of which has the potential for much 
broader conclusions to be drawn as to whether the value of 
information inherent in competitiveness indicators differs 
according to the level of economic performance. We show 
that it does, and that it does so in a significant way. Secondly, 
a quantitative analysis related to this question is missing.
We build our empirical analysis on the assessment of 
firstly, the existing and rather scarce evaluation of the 
relationship between the data on national competitiveness 
published by WEF and economic performance, which is 
contained in the first section of the paper, and secondly, 
the vast results regarding factors of economic growth, 
which is the subject of the second section.
The WEF competitiveness indicators promote the cap-
ture of especially microeconomic aspects of productiv-
ity and therefore, given the very basics of growth theory, 
it is expected that as such they should be related to the 
actual development of economic performance. However, 
the empirical evidence related to these questions is very 
scarce, especially sofar as less economically developed 
countries are concerned. On the other hand, there is a huge 
body of empirical assessment of the factors of economic 
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growth, per se unrelated to the competitiveness indica-
tors. We pay close attention to the results of this strand of 
research as it may help us to understand what may be hid-
den behind the statistical relationships that exist between 
economic performance and competitiveness indicators.
In the third section we present the data used in the 
empirical analysis, the various subsets of countries 
on which the analysis was performed, as well as the econo-
metric approach taken. As we explain in that section, we 
employed an Arellano-Bond estimator. The fourth section 
of the paper states the results of the estimation and their 
assessment. The key findings are summarised in the final 
part of the paper, where we also relate the results back to 
both the first and second sections of the paper.
2 WEF indicators of competitiveness and 
economic growth
Our analysis is based on the indicators published by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF). However, we assume it is 
appropriate to introduce the concept of competitiveness 
from a broader perspective.
Buckley et al. (1988) summarise the relevant measures 
of international competitiveness. They recommend differ-
entiating three dimensions: performance, potential, and 
management process, and four levels of analysis: country, 
industry, firm, and product. Delgado et al. (2012) empha-
sise three ideas connected with the evolution of the com-
petitiveness debate: market share, costs, and productivity. 
High market share can be a symptom of underlying loca-
tion advantages; however, the same result can be achieved 
through targeted and distortive subsidies as well. As they 
emphasise, the naïve interpretation of competitiveness 
as low costs is misguided if prosperity is the policy's objec-
tive. Camagni (2002) also supports the territory approach 
to the assessment of competitiveness. Well-known objec-
tions to the term in question come from Krugman (1994; 
1996), plus Cho and Moon (2005; 2013), who, generally 
speaking, consider the concept of macroeconomic com-
petitiveness elusive and misleading, with Cho and Moon 
(2005; 2013) and Lall (2001) focusing especially on the 
well-known approach developed by Porter (1990).
Moving on to the concept of competitiveness on which we 
build our own technical analysis, Trabold (1995) and Berger 
and Bristow (2009) discuss four aspects of national compet-
itiveness connected with the national level: the ability to sell 
(costs and trade performance), the ability to earn (productiv-
ity and performance orientation), the ability to adjust (inno-
vation and flexibility), and the ability to attract (place attrac-
tiveness). Fagerberg et al. (2007) deem the same aspects of 
competitiveness necessary; they accept Krugman's critical 
remarks and seek relevant indicators for four factors of eco-
nomic performance (technology competitiveness, capac-
ity competitiveness, price competitiveness, and demand 
competitiveness) with a view to identifying the differ-
ences among them and overcoming the lack of a traditional 
approach, which focuses solely on price and cost compar-
isons. Their analysis based on statistical data can be reck-
oned to be the alternative to the traditional approach, which 
is primarily concerned with the potentially damaging effects 
of excessive wage growth on the economy.
All aspects of competitiveness mentioned above are 
taken into account in the most famous international 
competitiveness rankings (the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook, the Global Competitiveness report). These rank-
ings point out the role of productivity and the capacities of 
countries to compete in world markets to improve their 
economic performance and standards of living. The final 
competitiveness indicator is constructed as a multidimen-
sional composite indicator. The declared aim of composite 
indicators is to be a comprehensive evaluation of national 
competitiveness of a heterogeneous group of countries 
with different characteristics and on various stages of 
development. The fact of this heterogeneity has given rise 
to frequent critical objections to the methodology of these 
rankings. According to Cho and Moon (2005; 2013) and 
Lall (2001), comparison of national competitiveness is 
more meaningful among the nations endowed with simi-
lar comparative advantages, situated on a similar level of 
development, and competing in similar industries. 
The main pros and cons of using composite indicators 
have been widely debated. The discussion is summarised 
by Saisana and Tarantola (2002); the use of uncertainty 
and sensitivity analysis for gaining useful insights during 
the process of building composite indicators is recom-
mended by Saisana et al. (2005). This methodology is 
accepted by Saltelli (2007), who, in the case of the Lisbon 
Strategy, explores the extent to which composite indica-
tors are able to fulfil the task of underpinning the develop-
ment of data-based narratives for political advocacy. 
The Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) is pub-
lished annually by the World Economic Forum (WEF). 
This annual competitiveness report is based mostly on soft 
data, which allows the monitoring of a larger number of 
countries than in the case of the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook. Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) for a given 
country is calculated as a weighted average of 12 pillars: 
institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environ-
ment, health and primary education, higher education and 
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training, goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, 
financial market development, technological readiness, 
market size, business sophistication, innovation. The first 
five pillars are referred to as basic requirements, the second 
five pillars are designated as efficiency enhancers and the 
last two pillars are known as innovation and sophistication 
factors. The weightings given to the pillars depend on the 
stage of development of the particular economy.
As Freudenberg (2003); Lall (2001); Ochel and 
Röhn (2006); Pérez-Moreno et al. (2016) point out, the 
choice of standardisation and normalisation method 
as well as the weighting given to the pillars has an impact 
on country rankings.
The results of checking the robustness of the WEF method-
ology were published in the Global Competitiveness Report 
(GCR) 2010–11. According to Nardo and Annoni (2010) 
the analysis confirms the GCI structure, but for some pil-
lars, it suggests a redundancy in the subpillar division. 
Furthermore, some indicators were found to be statistically 
unrelated to the rest of indicators in respect of one pillar.
Berger and Bristow (2009); Lall (2001); Ochel and 
Röhn (2006) and others dispute these tests of the WEF 
report's robustness and focus on correlation instead of 
causation. They identify the problem of circular rea-
soning and causation. The also criticise the explana-
tory power of the econometric analysis applied by WEF 
(the GDP growth in the previous year versus the GCI or 
some components of GCI in the current year) with respect 
to the predictive ability of GCI.
From the perspective of the African economies the 
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between 
the WEF competitiveness indicators and economic per-
formance is rather scarce. Some results may be found in 
the early Global Competitiveness Reports. In the case of 
low-income countries Porter (2004) identifies schooling, 
infrastructure, reduction of trade barriers and creation of 
financial markets as the key variables included in the com-
petitiveness indicators so far as economic performance is 
concerned. This was confirmed later by Porter et al. (2006; 
2007), the latter showing that the explanatory power of 
competitiveness indicators increases with the level of eco-
nomic development of the countries.
3 A review of factors of economic growth of 
African economies
3.1 The weakness of the growth theory
There are some general obstacles to identifying key 
drivers of economic growth that should be taken to 
account. Ulaşan (2012) presents an informative review of 
econometric approaches to the identification of key fac-
tors of economic growth. He shows that, given the cur-
rent strand of so-called new growth theories, the pool 
of possible growth determinants is virtually unlimited. 
Key limitations therefore come from the point of view of 
measurement and econometrical feasibility. This is well 
documented by Baştürk et al. (2012) who identify two dif-
ferent clusters in which the contribution of investment, 
real exchange rate distortions, trade openness, govern-
ment share in GDP and investment price to GDP growth 
are significantly different. The first cluster regarding 
the sub-Saharan African countries includes: Botswana, 
Cameroon, Lesotho, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo 
and Zimbabwe and the second cluster includes: Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan and Uganda. The most striking dif-
ferences are: the effect of investment on economic growth 
is positive in both clusters, however, it is much stronger 
in the second cluster; the effect of trade openness on eco-
nomic growth is positive in the first but negative in the 
second cluster; government share has a negative impact 
on economic growth in the first cluster but a positive one 
in the second cluster.
Moreover, Kenny and Williams (2001) argue that the 
failure of models of economic growth to produce repli-
cable empirical results is linked to the fact that the ori-
gins and experiences of the respective economies with 
long-run economic development are highly heteroge-
neous. From the point of view of standard economic 
modelling, this means that the models are ahistorical, 
which significantly limits their explanatory and pre-
dictive power. Similarly, Lall (2001) points out that the 
WEF index has two key problems. It assumes that mar-
kets are efficient and that policy intervention must be 
"market friendly". This assumption discards the possibil-
ity of selective responses as a function of market failures, 
which, as he argues, may be all the more relevant in case 
of developing countries.
3.2 Overview of the main factors of economic growth
Mijiyawa's (2013) analysis shows that the key growth fac-
tors are: share of investment in GDP, private sector access 
to credit, government effectiveness and share of gross 
value added of agriculture in GDP. He performs a regres-
sion analysis between GDP growth and typical growth 
factors such as initial level of GDP per capita, population 
growth and share of investment in GDP, as well as share of 
population with completed primary education, private sec-
tor access to credit, quality of institutions, trade openness, 
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share of value added of agriculture in GDP, inflation rate, 
urbanisation, and dummy for oil exporting countries. 
The analysis of the World Bank (Chuhan-Pole et al., 2018) 
confirms these findings. It concludes that in 2017 the aver-
age growth of GDP accelerated especially due to improve-
ments in terms of trade, higher metal production, improving 
conditions in agriculture and higher investment in physi-
cal capital. The key issues which represents an impediment 
to a more sustainable growth pattern seem to be linked to 
a weak infrastructure: electricity, water, sanitation, tele-
communications and transport. As regards infrastructure, 
Calderón and Servén (2010) find that infrastructure has 
a positive impact on economic growth and negative impact 
on income inequality. They conclude the results hold true 
for African as well as other economies. More importantly, 
so far as the quality of infrastructure is concerned, they 
estimate that the costs for the African economies to catch 
up with other regions of similar income level would amount 
to investment as large as 15 percent of GDP.
An interesting result regarding labour productivity 
comes from Harrison et al. (2014) who performed an anal-
ysis using World Bank's Enterprise Surveys in 80 coun-
tries (32 sub-Saharan countries) with total of 12 000 firms 
with the aim to compare the differences in labour produc-
tivity between non-rich African economies and the rest of 
the world. They show that the differences in labour pro-
ductivity are explained by differences in geography (pop-
ulation), infrastructure, political institutions, business 
environment and financial conditions. Controlling for the 
effects of these variables they show that firms in non-rich 
African countries have in fact a comparative advantage 
in respect of to labour productivity, reaching higher lev-
els of productivity as compared with the rest of the world.
However, as far as financial markets are concerned, 
Misati and Nyamongo (2012) demonstrate that financial 
liberalisation has tended to amplify the negative effect 
of inflation on economic growth. Thus, they recom-
mend a managed financial openness as opposed to total 
liberalisation.
Beny and Cook (2009) confirm that from 1995 onwards 
the growth of African economies has been driven by insti-
tutional and policy reforms, exports of primary resources, 
and improving terms of trade.
Danquah and Quattara (2014) meanwhile show that 
there has been no convergence in technical efficiency 
levels among sub-Saharan economies. They show that 
the key drivers of technical efficiency were trade open-
ness, stock of imported RD and machinery and the 
quality of institutions. On the other hand, they found the 
human capital factor to be insignificant. The findings of 
Jamison et al. (2007) show that the importance of human 
capital (quality of education) is more significant in an 
economic environment that is open to outside trade and 
influence. Badunenko et al. (2010) shows that the role of 
human capital is conditioned by the level of development. 
They demonstrate that the key sources of productivity 
growth are physical and human capital. The accumulation 
of physical capital was a much more important factor of 
productivity growth in poorer countries while the accu-
mulation of human capital in the richer ones.
3.3 Some specific issues of economic growth of 
African economies
3.3.1 Institutions
As the research shows the idea of free markets as a solution 
to all economic problems should be discarded. Once more 
turning to Lall (1999; 2001), he points out the necessity 
of specific approach in the process of the choice of suit-
able macroeconomic policies in the developing countries. 
Free markets themselves cannot lead countries to develop 
the systemic abilities they need to cope efficiently with 
new technologies. Rapid liberalisation in sub-Saharan 
Africa has led to massive destruction of industrial capacity 
because the conditions needed for technological upgrad-
ing had not been laid down. Lall (1999) shows that govern-
ment interventions are not necessarily distorting – on the 
contrary, policies to remedy market failures are legiti-
mate factors deciding comparative advantage. The impor-
tance of institutions is well documented by Bertocchi and 
Guerzoni (2012) who examine the sources of fragility of 
sub-Saharan economies. They rely on the concept of fra-
gility as defined by the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment ratings compiled by the World Bank. The sam-
ple consists of 41 sub-Saharan economies and the sample 
period runs from 1992 to 2007. The key factor of fragil-
ity identified by the estimations was institutional stability 
with other factors, including economic variables, having 
much lesser role or being insignificant altogether.
The analysis of Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016) con-
firms the necessity of respecting the specificities of sub-Sa-
haran African countries in the process of macroeconomic 
decisions. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions in the 
world that reflects characteristics of state fragility: weak 
governments, insufficient security and legal frameworks, 
ineffective administration, poor public services, high rates 
of conflicts and civil wars, and growing extreme poverty. 
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Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2016) test the hypothesis that 
state fragility is a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying 
by power holders. The resulting finding of great interest is 
the following: political interference, rent seeking and lob-
bying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigat-
ing the effectiveness of governance capacity. The validity 
of the hypothesis was confirmed in a scenario of extreme 
state fragility. Blanket fragility-oriented policies will be 
misplaced unless they are contingent on the degree of 
fragility, since fragile and extremely fragile countries 
respond differently to economic, institutional and demo-
graphic characteristics of state fragility. 
Closely linked to the quality of institutions is the ques-
tion of corruption, which in fact does not need to have 
strictly negative consequences. An interesting result 
is presented by Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) 
who show that the effects of corruption depend on the 
extent to which bureaucrats coordinate their rent-seek-
ing behaviour. Their analysis predicts that countries with 
organised corruption networks are likely to display lower 
levels of bribes, higher levels of research activity and 
higher rates of growth than countries with disorganised 
corruption arrangements.
In Mahagaonkar (2008) it is shown that corruption has 
a negative effect on product innovation and organisational 
innovation. Corruption does not affect process innova-
tion while it facilitates marketing innovation. According 
to Mahaonkar's findings, corruption is more disruptive 
to innovative activities mainly due to imperfect financial 
markets, selection of wrong projects by officials due to 
adverse selection, deliberate delays, a decrease in invest-
ment, and an increase in the cost of corruption. 
Ugur (2014) shows that the effect of corruption 
on per-capita GDP is more adverse when primary studies 
take averages of the corruption data over periods longer 
than 5 years, when they use data for low income countries 
only and when they are published journal papers rather 
than book chapters or working papers. The stronger neg-
ative effect associated with the time period over which 
corruption data is averaged indicates that corruption has 
more adverse effects on per-capita GDP in the longer run 
as opposed to the short run.
3.3.2 Electrification
One of the key issues related to infrastructure which was 
shown to be one of the major obstacles to economic growth 
of the region is electrification. Peters and Sievert (2015) 
alert to the specificity of African countries in evaluation 
of socio-economic effects of electrification. Their analysis 
shows that in rural Africa, where most of the non-elec-
trified households live, demand is very low. According to 
their analysis, the low electricity consumption can be 
served by low-cost solar alternatives. The authors regard 
the lack of access to markets in the short run as much more 
important for the development of non-agricultural activi-
ties than electrification.
Neelsen and Peters (2011) evaluate impacts of electri-
fication on micro-firm performance in Uganda. Both the 
quantitative and qualitative information indicate that 
the effects on firm performance measured by profits or 
employee's income are small. They find no evidence 
for an expansionary effect of electrification on firm prof-
its or worker remuneration, but they find a positive indi-
rect impact of electrification due to the overall expansive 
effect on local demand.
Analysis of Scott et al. (2014) concentrate on SME in low 
and middle-income countries and reach similar results. 
Pre-existing conditions such as location, access to finance, 
and management competence have a strong impact on how 
access to electricity affects SME. Electricity access seems 
to have a lower positive impact on productivity of micro 
enterprises. This may be partly due to the fact that such 
firms do not use electricity-dependent machinery and pro-
cesses, and partly because they lack backup power capac-
ity to cope with outages in case they increase their reliance 
on electricity-dependent processes.
3.3.3 Natural resources
The economic growth of many African economies is 
closely related to natural resources, a fact which brings 
about various specific issues. Perrings (2014) presents 
an extensive analysis of negative side effects of economic 
growth based on exploitation of natural assets. He points 
to the fact that most of the standard economic growth mod-
els do not take account of externalities caused by exploita-
tion of natural assets.
Maswana and Farooki (2013) found evidence that insuf-
ficient imported technologies explain the occurrence of 
resource curse in the long run although natural resources 
still indicate short-run positive effects on economic 
growth. In their view, this opens up room for public policy 
to offset the negative effects on long-run growth. 
The negative effects of economic growth based on 
natural resources may be higher than most of the stud-
ies indicate. Brückner (2010) shows that using a purchas-
ing power parity adjusted measure (defined as natural 
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resource exports in US dollars over PPP GDP) yields an 
economically much larger negative relationship between 
per capita GDP growth and natural resource dependence 
than what has been suggested by the nominal measure. 
Consistent with the rent-seeking literature, he shows that 
the resource curse is a symptom of societies characterised 
by high levels of corruption and sluggish checks on polit-
ical decision-making. 
The link between the effects of exploitation of natural 
resources and institutions was also brought up by van der 
Ploeg and Venables (2012). The reasons for a relatively 
fast depletion in the developing countries are connected 
with the scarcity of capital, volatility of natural resources 
prices, and the fragility of state governance. In countries 
with fragile states or who exhibit an inability to con-
strain wasteful spending the recommended option may be 
to keep natural resources in the ground until the politi-
cal system improves. Cust (2017) also identifies the rate of 
fragility of state governance as the key aspect of the final 
impacts. Countries with relatively weak governance, such 
as a lack of constraints on executive power, run the ele-
vated risk of various resource curse challenges. 
The relationship between the effects of natural resources 
and institutions probably does not run one way only. 
Arezki and van der Ploeg (2007) provide new evidence 
for the impact of natural resource dependence on income 
per capita. They find a significant indirect effect of natu-
ral resources on institutions. The natural resource curse 
is particularly detrimental to economic performance 
in countries with a low degree of trade openness.
From a different perspective, Sarr et al. (2011) show that 
international lending to poorer dictatorial countries whose 
performance is based on natural assets typically leads to 
looting, an economic strategy undermining long-run eco-
nomic development. The reason why financial institu-
tions are willing to lend to such countries is a moral haz-
ard problem in the form of not internalising the risks of 
default, believing falsely that the large amount of natural 
assets precludes default.
3.3.4 Other environmental and historical factors
Bolt and Bezemer (2009) refute the proposition put for-
ward by Acemoglu et al. (2001) that the higher settler mor-
tality lead to setting up a system of even more extractive 
institutions which undermined the perspective of long-
run economic development. They show, first, that higher 
settler mortality in fact did not lead to a sparser density 
of European settlement and, second, the lower density of 
European settlement did not lead to more extractive insti-
tutions. They show that the key drivers of economic growth 
in the former colonies are education, with expected pos-
itive effect, and the high occurrence of disease (malaria) 
with negative effect. The analysis of Bhattacharyya (2009) 
confirms that the spread of Malaria plays an important role 
in explaining the evolution of national savings used as a 
measure of economic development. Badunenko et al. (2010) 
show that geographical factors also play an important role 
when comparing northern African and sub-Saharan econ-
omies. Greater exposure to tropical diseases and rain-
falls lowers the returns on foreign direct investment and 
increases transaction costs on trade.
Pointing to the above-mentioned Bolt and Bezemer (2009), 
from a broader historical point of view, the discussion of 
long-run economic development by Bertocchi (2011) reveals 
that one of the specific factors in African context is slavery, 
both export slavery and internal one. Especially, turning 
to Nunn (2008) she argues that there is a robust negative 
relationship between the number of exported slaves from 
1400 to 1900 in a country (geographical area) and its cur-
rent economic development. The mechanism through which 
it worked is supposed to lie in negative effects of past export 
of slavery on institutions including ethnic fractionalisation 
caused by warfare directly connected with acquiring slaves. 
Another specific factor is fertility. Hafner and Mayer-
Foulkes (2013) show a causal long-run relationship 
between high income, high human development and low 
fertility. In economically advanced economies, with the 
completed demographic transition, only changes in human 
development and income matter. In developing countries, 
fertility is negatively related to human development, but 
positively to income and trade.
4 Data and econometric approach
We follow up on many of the papers which we referred 
to in the previous section to set up a basic structure that 
relates economic performance on one hand to evolution of 
capital on the other hand. We employ data from the World 
Bank. The economic performance is measured by three 
variables: gross domestic product per capita in purchas-
ing power parity referred to as GDP/capita, gross domestic 
product per person employed in purchasing power parity 
referred to as GDP/empl, and gross national income per 
capita in purchasing power parity referred to as GNI/cap-
ita. As we detail further below, the estimation will be per-
formed on differenced data, which means that the develop-
ment of the performance indicators includes information 
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on the evolution of both output and population. We do 
not measure capital by fixed assets because such a series 
is available only at a frequency of five years. Therefore, 
we measure the role of capital as a ratio of gross capital 
formation and gross domestic product. This variable is 
referred to as investment.
This basic structure is extended by autoregression in the 
performance indicator and by the information included 
in the competitiveness indices published by WEF. Given 
the discussion above, we are particularly interested in the 
subindex of basic requirements denoted as GCIBR, in the 
subindex of efficiency enhancers denoted as GCIEE, and 
in the subindex of innovation and sophistication factors 
denoted as GCIIF. 
In the Appendix (Table 5) summarises the statisti-
cal properties of these series expressed in logarithms. 
The sample starts in 2006 and ends in 2017. The sample 
of the actual estimations is reduced due the inclusion of 
lagged dependent variable and instruments. The sample of 
the actual estimations is indicated in Tables 1 and 2.
We test for the presence of unit roots by utilising the 
Breitung unit root tests. We suppose the following repre-
sentation of the panel:
∆ ∆y y y xi t i t i j i t j
j
n
i t i t
i
, , , , , ,
,= + + +− −
=
∑α β δ ε1
1
 (1)
where y represents the endogenous variable, x stands 
for exogenous variables, ε represents errors, i denotes 
cross-sections, j = 1 … ni signifies possible different lag 
orders for the cross-sections.
As well as another unit root test frequently used in 
panel analysis, the Levin-Lin-Chu test, the Breitung unit 
root test assumes a common unit root process across the 
cross-sections. From the point of view of Eq. (1) this 
means that the parameter α is not differentiated according 
to the cross-sections. This assumption is preferable in this 
case because the sample is not based on particularly long 
data series. In addition to this fact, the Breitung test is 
less computationally complex than the Levin-Lin-Chu 
test, which given the data limitations with respect to time 
Table 1 African economies
Model GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF
Dependent gdp/capita gdp/empl gni/capita
Dep. (-1) 0.90*** 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.90*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.93***
Investment 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.06***
CI 0.01*** −0.01 0.00 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01** −0.01 0.01***
J-statistic 28.69 28.62 28.X 28.42 28.91 26.66 27.62 25.65 26.86
AR(1) −2.43** −2.48** −2.46** −2.48** −2.39** −2.40** −3.33*** −2.79** −3.36***
AR(2) −0.82 −0.69 −0.76 −1.36 −1.38 −1.47 −1.42 −1.34 −1.35
Notes: African economies listed in Appendix (Table 6): no. of cross-section, 29, time sample, 2008:2017
The competitiveness indicators GCIBR, GCIEE and GCIIF, and the performance indicators gdp/capita, gdp/empl, and gni/capita are explained 
in Section 3. CI refers to the competitiveness indicator used as an explanatory variable in the particular regression; this is given by the indicator 
used to name each model. Instruments: dynamic one lag of competitiveness indicator. J-statistic refers to the test of the validity of over-identifying 
restrictions with the null of the restrictions being valid. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to m-statistic of autocorrelation test in residuals with the null of no 
autocorrelation. *, **, *** means rejection of the null at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level of significance, respectively.
Table 2 Sub-Saharan economies
Model GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF
Dependent gdp/capita gdp/empl gni/capita
Dep. (-1) 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.88*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 0.94***
Investment 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.07***
CI 0.03*** 0.02 0.00 0.05*** 0.04 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02 0.01***
J-statistic 23.19 23.16 22.45 24.75 24.29 21.12 23.33 22.35 22.56
AR(1) −2.34** −0.36 −2.37** −2.31** −2.20** −2.22** −2.82** −0.01 −3.15***
AR(2) −1.07 −0.16 −0.88 −1.98** −1.85* −1.70 −1.60 −1.57 −1.50
Notes: Sub-Saharan economies listed in Appendix (Table 7): no. of cross-section, 25, time sample, 2008:2017
The competitiveness indicators GCIBR, GCIEE and GCIIF, and the performance indicators gdp/capita, gdp/empl, and gni/capita are explained 
in Section 3. CI refers to the competitiveness indicator used as an explanatory variable in the particular regression; this is given by the indicator 
used to name each model. Instruments: dynamic one lag of competitiveness indicator. J-statistic refers to the test of the validity of over-identifying 
restrictions with the null of the restrictions being valid. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to m-statistic of autocorrelation test in residuals with the null of no 
autocorrelation. *, **, *** means rejection of the null at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level of significance, respectively.
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makes it more convenient for the purpose of our analysis. 
The null hypothesis of the Breitung test is that α is equal to 
zero, which means that the data contain unit root process. 
The results in Appendix (Table 5) show that none of the 
series was found stationary in levels while all of them are 
stationary in first differences. 
We perform the empirical investigation on several 
sets of African economies. The broadest set includes all 
African economies with sufficient data and is presented 
in the Appendix (Table 6). The subset of this initial sam-
ple are sub-Saharan economies as listed in the Appendix 
(Table 7). Further, we perform the analysis on two subsets 
of sub-Saharan economies which we denote as being mid-
dle income and low-income economies. The economies 
designated as lower and upper middle income by WEF 
are joined in the subset of middle- income economies and 
are listed in the Appendix (Table 8). Finally, Appendix 
(Table 9) presents the subset of low- income economies.
The general structure of the empirical model we 
estimate is:
y c y xi t i i t i t i t, , , , ,= + + +−α δ ε1  (2)
where c represents constants, y contains economic perfor-
mance indicator, x contains investment and competitive-
ness indicator. Given the fact that yt−1 and c are positively 
correlated, OLS cannot be employed. Any transforma-
tion based on fixed or random effects approach does not 
solve the problem as it would contain positive correla-
tion between the transformed error term and transformed 
lagged depended variable. Therefore, this type of model is 
typically dealt with in first differences:
∆ ∆ ∆ ∆y y xi t i t i t i t, , , , ,= + +−α δ ε1  (3)
which have already been shown to be stationary, see 
Appendix (Table 5). The estimation of the transformation 
(Eq. (3)) typically rests on generalised method of moments, 
GMM, which employs instrumental variables. We now 
summarise the approach taken in this analysis.
Given the structure of the empirical model (Eq. (2)) we 
have to account for possible endogeneity relationships, 
possible autocorrelation and fixed effects and also non-
stationarity of the series, which is reported in Appendix 
(Table 5). Therefore, we resort to the Arellano-Bond esti-
mator. We use dynamically one lag of the competitive-
ness indicator, GCIBR, GCIEE or GCIIF, as instruments. 
The validity of instruments was tested by a Sargan-Hansen 
J-test, which is reported in Tables 1 to 4.
In the estimation we employ a two-step White weight-
ing matrix, which is robust to panel-specific autocorrela-
tion and heteroscedasticity. Autocorrelation in the residuals 
was tested by means of an Arellano-Bond test for the pres-
ence of autoregression in the residuals. Given the fact that 
the model is estimated in first differences, the Arellano-
Bond test for AR(1) shows possible autoregression in the 
first differences of the residuals. This is confirmed in many 
of the cases, and was also expected. The more important 
is the test for the AR(2) autoregression, which indicates 
whether or not there is autoregression in the levels of the 
residuals. These results are also reported in Tables 1 to 4. 
The estimation was performed in Eviews.
The main drawback of working with instruments is that 
in practice, there are many sets of instruments which may 
be used to employ the GMM estimator. As the underly-
ing, true, economic model is unknown and various known 
factors cannot be measured it is generally impossible 
to choose an optimal set of instruments. 
5 Analysis of the results
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the results of the estimations 
performed on the whole set of African economies and 
Table 3 Middle income sub-Saharan economies
Model GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF
Dependent gdp/capita gdp/empl gni/capita
Dep. (-1) 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.71*** 0.76*** 0.74*** 0.87*** 0.94*** 0.90***
Investment 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.06***
CI 0.03*** 0.01 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.04 -0.02 0.01
J-statistic 10.95 7.92 10.21 9.29 8.35 9.58 9.18 10.41 9.63
AR(1) −1.52 −1.46 −1.45 −1.44 −1.40 −1.37 −1.42 −2.26** −2.26**
AR(2) −1.76* −1.87* −1.94** −2.14** −2.43** −2.49** −0.02 −0.29 −0.33
Notes: Sub-Saharan middle-income economies listed in Appendix (Table 8): no. of cross-section, 12, time sample, 2008:2017
The competitiveness indicators GCIBR, GCIEE and GCIIF, and the performance indicators gdp/capita, gdp/empl, and gni/capita are explained 
in Section 3. CI refers to the competitiveness indicator used as an explanatory variable in the particular regression; this is given by the indicator 
used to name each model. Instruments: dynamic one lag of competitiveness indicator. J-statistic refers to the test of the validity of over-identifying 
restrictions with the null of the restrictions being valid. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to m-statistic of autocorrelation test in residuals with the null of no 
autocorrelation. *, **, *** means rejection of the null at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level of significance, respectively.
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on the subset of sub-Saharan economies, respectively. 
While the development of GDP per capita is determined 
by investment and its past evolution as expected we find no 
support for the role of the information included in either of 
the two subindices of the competitiveness index GCIEE 
and GCIIF. The only subindex which displays a significant 
impact on the economic development is the basic require-
ments subindex GCIBR. However, the picture changes 
when we measure the economic performance by GDP per 
person employed and GNI per capita. In both sets of coun-
tries, all African economies and sub-Saharan economies, 
we find evidence for a positive impact of the subindices 
of innovation and sophistication factors and of general 
requirements on economic performance and in the case 
of the broader set of African economies we also find evi-
dence for a positive relationship between GDP per person 
employed and the subindex of efficiency enhancers. 
When comparing the role of basic requirements, given 
the estimated coefficients, there is a slightly stronger 
role of basic requirements in sub-Saharan economies 
with GDP per person employed or GNI per capita as eco-
nomic performance indicators in comparison with the 
sample of all African economies. This cannot be stated 
about the effect of the subindex of innovation and sophis-
tication factors whose role seems to be, if statistically sig-
nificant, quantitatively similar.
As far as the estimates for the role of investment are con-
cerned, there are practically no differences in the estimates 
between the sample of all African economies and the sample 
of sub-Saharan economies. We find a slightly lower autore-
gression in case of GDP per person employed in the sample 
of sub-Saharan economies as compared to the sample of all 
African economies but this has little practical significance.
Overall the estimates show that especially factors like 
institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, 
health and primary education, higher education and train-
ing summarised by the subindex of basic requirements 
and the factors of business sophistication and innovation 
entering the subindex of innovation and sophistication 
play an important role. On the other hand, the effects of 
goods market efficiency, labour market efficiency, finan-
cial market development and technological readiness, fac-
tors which may be categorised under the subindex of effi-
ciency enhancers, play a practically indiscernible role. 
This may be partly explained by the dubious role of finan-
cial markets in macroeconomic development as discussed 
in the paper by Misati and Nyamongo (2012). 
Next, we turn to the middle and low-income sub-Saha-
ran economies. The results for these two sets are given in 
Tables 3 and 4.
In the case of the middle-income sub-Saharan econo-
mies and gross national income per capita as economic 
performance indicator we do not find support for any of the 
competitiveness subindices to be an explanatory factor of 
the economic development. However, there is some support 
especially for the basic requirements and business sophisti-
cation and innovation factors when we take GDP per capita 
or per person employed as indicators of economic perfor-
mance. It needs to be noted, however, that there is some 
residual autocorrelation in each of those estimates.
Comparing the results with those for the sample of all 
sub-Saharan economies, the role of investment is a little 
higher. The impact of the basic requirements and business 
sophistication and innovation factors is also higher, but not 
in the case of GNI as measure of economic performance. 
The role of the competitiveness indicators is also higher 
Table 4 Low income sub-Saharan economies
Model GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF GCIBR GCIEE GCIIF
Dependent gdp/capita gdp/empl gni/capita
Dep. (-1) 0.84*** 0.90*** 0.86*** 0.82*** 0.87*** 0.82*** 0.89*** 0.86*** 0.90***
Investment 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.03***
CI 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.07** 0.05
J-statistic 9.98 8.86 6.91 9.61 9.81 7.60 12.41 11.48 11.74
AR(1) −1.71* −1.00 −1.82* −1.69* −0.75 −0.46 −2.23** −1.97* −2.43**
AR(2) 01.09 0.31 0.52 −0.19 −0.24 0.01 −1.63 −1.64 −1.64
Notes: Sub-Saharan low-income economies listed in Appendix (Table 9): no. of cross-section, 13, time sample, 2008:2017.
The competitiveness indicators GCIBR, GCIEE and GCIIF, and the performance indicators gdp/capita, gdp/empl, and gni/capita are explained 
in Section 3. CI refers to the competitiveness indicator used as an explanatory variable in the particular regression; this is given by the indicator 
used to name each model. Instruments: dynamic one lag of competitiveness indicator. J-statistic refers to the test of the validity of over-identifying 
restrictions with the null of the restrictions being valid. AR(1) and AR(2) refer to m-statistic of autocorrelation test in residuals with the null of no 
autocorrelation. *, **, *** means rejection of the null at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level of significance, respectively.
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than in the sample of all African economies, once again 
when GDP is used as measure of economic performance.
The fact that the results for gross national income as 
an economic performance indicator may be weaker with 
respect to the competitiveness indicators is not surprising. 
Gross national income is, among other factors, positively 
influenced by remittances, which make a significant part 
of national income in some of the sub-Saharan economies 
and, on the other hand, it is negatively influenced by out-
flow of returns on foreign investment in those economies 
which receive it.
We do not detect any statistically significant relation-
ships between the economic performance and competi-
tiveness indicators in the case of low-income economies. 
All the econometric estimation shows that we can detect 
significant relationships especially between factors such as 
institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, 
health and primary education, higher education and train-
ing, business sophistication and innovation on one hand and 
economic performance on the other hand. These relation-
ships are the strongest in case of middle-income sub-Saharan 
economies and GDP as measure of economic performance.
The results bear a resemblance to the conclusions pre-
sented by other researches in the previous decade, which 
we mentioned in the first section of the paper. Namely it is 
the key role of the factors summarised in the basic require-
ments subindex and the fact that statistically significant 
relationships were detected in the middle income and not 
in the case of low-income countries. However, due to the 
completely different data sets and methods used we are 
not able to directly compare these quantitative results with 
the estimates of these much older studies.
6 Conclusion
The analysis focused on the relationship between three 
subsets of the WEF competitiveness index, namely 
basic requirements, efficiency enhancers and innovation 
and sophistication factors, and economic performance. 
The relationship was tested on a sample of African econ-
omies and then various subsamples: sub-Saharan econo-
mies, middle income sub-Saharan economies and low-in-
come sub-Saharan economies.
The empirical evaluation of this question was per-
formed by extending a very basic relationship between 
the evolution of economic performance per capita and the 
development of investment and lagged value of economic 
performance by including the competitiveness subindices.
In the case of African economies as a whole we showed 
that, independent of the measure of economic perfor-
mance, the basic requirements of the competitiveness indi-
cator always yield relevant information in the assessment 
of economic performance. When gross domestic product 
per person employed or gross national income per cap-
ita are used as measures of economic performance, inno-
vation and sophistication factors are also relevant to the 
explanation of the development of economic performance.
The results are qualitatively very similar in the case 
of sub-Saharan economies. When we focused on mid-
dle income sub-Saharan economies, we found that basic 
requirements and innovation and sophistication factors 
are relevant to the evolution of economic performance 
if it is measured by gross domestic product per capita or 
gross domestic product per person employed. Their influ-
ence on economic performance is on average higher than 
in the case of all African or all sub-Saharan economies. 
The relationship is lost when gross national income is used 
as a measure of economic performance. We did not detect 
any statistically significant relationships between compet-
itiveness indicators and economic performance in the case 
of low-income countries.
Given the results coming from the overview of the 
growth literature focused on African economies, we can 
therefore confirm the key role of policies promoting edu-
cation, especially primary and secondary, infrastructure, 
the quality of institutions, especially regarding corrup-
tion, and trade. However, it should be noted, following up 
on the discussion of the factors of growth, that some of the 
frequently mentioned policies, electrification being a good 
example, in fact do not need to lead to significant positive 
changes in economic performance, especially if imple-
mented in an isolated manner without taking account of 
related investment that together with electrification might 
ultimately boost business performance. 
The question of dismantling barriers to trade, which 
seems to be very important for promoting economic 
growth, is tightly related to the attitudes of the key busi-
ness partners abroad who seem to continue preferring 
importation of raw materials or at best products with neg-
ligible value added with the aim of using it for further pro-
cessing at home or third countries. The existence of severe 
both tariff and nontariff measures imposed on processed 
and manufactured production coming from Africa is doc-
umented by Verter (2017). 
It has to be noted, however, that the linkages between 
the results of this study and results presented in the first 
and second sections of the paper are informal. Strictly 
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Table 5 Statistical properties of the series
Series/Statistics Mean Standard deviation Normality Unit root – series in levels Unit root – series in 1st differences
gdp 8.07 0.88 22.80*** −0.69 −4.83***
gdpe 9.11 0.97 21.85*** −1.00 −3.03***
gni 8.05 0.88 21.82*** −0.17 −2.99***
gcibr 3.80 0.54 12.65*** 2.97 −2.02**
gciee 3.48 0.42 0.45 −1.19 −3.99***
gciif 3.27 0.37 1.27 −0.95 −4.35***
gcf 3.14 0.41 506.47*** 3.49 −5.86***
Notes: gdp (gross domestic product in PPP per capita), gdpe (gross domestic product in PPP per person employed), gni (gross national income in 
PPP per capita), gcibr (subindex of basic requirements of the global competitiveness index), gciee (subindex of efficiency enhancers of the global 
competitiveness index), gciif (subindex of innovation and sophistication factors of the global competitiveness index), normality is tested by Jarque-
Bera test under the null of normal distribution, unit root is tested by Breitung test under the null of unit root. All series expressed in logarithms.
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Table 6 Whole sample
Code Country Code Country Code Country
DZA Algeria LSO Lesotho TCD Chad
BWA Botswana MRT Mauritania MDG Madagascar
MUS Mauritius MAR Morocco MWI Malawi
NAM Namibia NGA Nigeria MLI Mali
ZAF South Africa TUN Tunisia MOZ Mozambique
CMR Cameroon ZMB Zambia SEN Senegal
CIV Côte d'Ivoire BEN Benin TAN Tanzania
EGY Egypt BDI Burundi UGA Uganda
GHA Ghana ETH Ethiopia ZWE Zimbabwe
KEN Kenya GMB Gambia
Table 7 Sub-Saharan countries
Code Country Code Country Code Country
BWA Botswana MRT Mauritania MWI Malawi
MUS Mauritius NGA Nigeria MLI Mali
NAM Namibia ZMB Zambia MOZ Mozambique
ZAF South Africa BEN Benin SEN Senegal
CMR Cameroon BDI Burundi TAN Tanzania
CIV Côte d´Ivoire ETH Ethiopia UGA Uganda
GHA Ghana GMB Gambia ZWE Zimbabwe
KEN Kenya TCD Chad
LSO Lesotho MDG Madagascar
Table 8 Middle income sub-Saharan countries
Code Country Code Country Code Country
BWA Botswana CMR Cameroon LSO Lesotho
MUS Mauritius CIV Côte d´Ivoire MRT Mauritania
NAM Namibia GHA Ghana NGA Nigeria
ZAF South Africa KEN Kenya ZMB Zambia
Table 9 Low income sub-Saharan countries
Code Country Code Country Code Country
BEN Benin MDG Madagascar TAN Tanzania
BDI Burundi MWI Malawi UGA Uganda
ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali ZWE Zimbabwe
GMB Gambia MOZ Mozambique
TCD Chad SEN Senegal   
